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POINT 1
BOTH THE "FACTS" AND THE LAW CITED IN THE RESPONDENTS BRIEF
CLEARLY ESTABLISH THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANTING OF THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ERRONEOUS.
The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and adopt the amicus
brief and reply brief filed by the amicus curiae

National Parks and

Conservation Association ("NPCA"), represented by counsel William
J. Lockhart, Esq, as though the said briefs were contained herein.
This court examines an appeal from a lower court's review of
an administrative decision as if the appeal had come directly from
the agency, and this court does not need to defer to the lower
court's findings and conclusions.

Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of

Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1983).

Actually, there are

no lower court findings and conclusions, except those set forth in
Judge Raymond S. Uno's Memorandum Decision dated December 4, 1987.
See Appellants' Brief, Addendum, Exhibit No. 6.

Under these

circumstances, this court may disregard Judge Unofs Memorandum
Decision, and look to the "record" from the administrative agency.
This "record" consists solely of the Utah State Engineer's
Memorandum Decision dated December 26, 1985, and the "Affidavit of
Kent Jones" —

Appendixes "B" and "D" to Respondent's brief.

In pages 9-16 of the Respondent's brief, the Engineer argues
this case was ripe for summary judgment in the trial court because
it involves only a "legal" matter. On pages 11-12 of his brief he
states:
Plaintiffs argue there are factual disputes which
require the taking of evidence (Appellants' Brief, pp.
14-19) . Not so. We claim — and the District Court held
— that the change application process under Section 733-3 is narrow in scope, and the only issue before the
State Engineer and the courts on appeal is whether there
is reason to believe that the change could be made

without impairing other vested water rights. (R. 52 0-521
A "C") . That being the case, the only material fact
relevant to whether Plaintiffs are "aggrieved persons"
under Section 73-3-14, is whether they own water rights
which might be impaired by the change.
After making the argument that there are no "factual" disputes
in the record, the Engineer then proceeds throughout the remainder
of the brief to argue "facts" which have absolutely no support in
the "record" before this court, and which are contradicted by the
memoranda decisions filed as Exhibits in the appendix of the reply
brief of amicus

National Parks and Conservation Association.

For example, on page 40 of the Respondent's brief, he states:
In addition, the State Engineer's Office has never
interpreted the criteria of Section 73-3-8 as applying
to change applications.
In approving or rejecting a
change application, the State Engineer only considers
whether other rights will be impaired.
The State
Engineer's disposition of a subject change application
is fully consistent with this long-held interpretation
of the applicable statutes.
Long standing agency
interpretation or construction of statutes governing the
agency are given great difference by the courts in
determining legislative intent, (emphasis added)
All this rhetoric may sound fine in isolation, however there
is not one shred of evidence before this court to support any of
the conclusions made on page 4 0 in the cited provision above.
Moreover, this interpretation by the Engineer is being raised for
the first time on appeal, and under general principles of appellate
review, this court may not consider points raised by the Engineer
for the first time on appeal.
Even if this court could consider the conclusionary statements
made on page

40 about the Engineer's

"long

standing

agency

interpretation or construction of statutes governing the agency,"
the Plaintiffs submit this court cannot find one letter, word,
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sentence, paragraph or exhibit anywhere in the "record11 or within
the four corners of either the Respondent's brief or the
curiae

brief which supports the conclusion.

amicus

Surprisingly, there

is no affidavit from the Engineer himself stating he has never
interpreted the criteria of Section 73-3-8 as applying to change
applications. There is no affidavit from him stating that he only
considers whether other rights will be impaired in approving or
rejecting a change application.
Finally, there is no affidavit from the Engineer stating he
has any long standing agency interpretation or construction of
statues governing the water laws.

His counselfs bare, naked

conclusions are not "evidence" and do not appear anywhere in the
"record" presented to this court. The Engineer may be embarrassed
because the record is so totally defective in submitting such an
affidavit in the trial court, however that problem is something he
must acknowledge, but he should not try to hoodwink this court into
believing "disputed" facts are not in dispute.
Not only is there a total void of any affidavit by counsel
establishing "facts" to support the conclusions made on page 4 0 of
Respondent's brief, there are not even any citations to memoranda
decisions or other documents from the Engineer's office that might
support this conclusion.

Finally, it must be acknowledged there

are no exhibits in either the Respondent's brief or the amici water
users'

brief

purporting

to be memoranda

decisions

or other

documents declaring the Engineer has never interpreted the criteria
of Section 73-3-8 as applying to change applications, or that he
has only considered whether other rights will be impaired when
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approving or rejecting a change application.
In stark contrast to this total lack of any "record" on the
part of the Respondent and the amici

water users, the reply brief

of amicus NPCA is replete with numerous instances, including copies
of the appropriate memoranda decisions in its addendum, which
clearly

demonstrate

the

statements

made

on

page

4 0 of

the

Respondent's brief are not accurate. These examples in the amicus
NPCA's reply brief reveal several times the State Engineer has in
fact applied the criteria of Section 73-3-8 to change applications,
and has further considered both the public interest and particular
objections by individual protestants who do not own any "vested
water rights" in approving or rejecting a change application. The
Engineer's failure to bring these other inconsistent memoranda
decisions to the attention of this court appears to be an attempt
to mislead this court as to what the Engineer's "long established
practices and interpretations" are.

In any event, it is clear

there is no "record" to support the bare, naked conclusions made
on page 4 0 of the Respondent's brief, and it also appears clear
those conclusions are not accurate, and are effectively rebutted
by the inclusion of other memoranda decisions in the NPCA's brief.
For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiffs submit the
Respondent's brief raises serious factual disputes dealing with
interpretation given by the State Engineer to the criteria of
Section 73-3-8 as applying to change applications, and this fact
by itself would preclude the trial or this court granting summary
j udgment.

-4-

In addition to the "factual" disputes in the Respondent's
brief, the Engineer also cites a recent Utah Court of Appeals
decision, allegedly supporting the Engineer's position that the
Plaintiffs in the instant case are not entitled to a review of the
Engineer's memorandum decision because the statute did not so
provide.

See page 11 of Respondent's brief and the discussion of

the case of Robert J. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appealsf
95 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah 1988).
If this Utah Court of Appeals decision has any bearing on any
of the issues in the instant case, it escapes the Plaintiffs! All
the court of appeals held in DeBry was that the court had appellate
jurisdiction over "(a) The final orders and decrees of State and
local agencies or appeals from the district court review of
them..."

The court then said it was authorized to review agency

decisions only when the legislature expressly authorizes a right
of review, and since there was no right of review to DeBry in the
final order of the Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, his appeal
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Obviously DeBry has

nothing to do with the instant case, where the right of review of
the decision of the Utah State Engineer is specifically provided
for in Sections 73-3-14 and 15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.
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POINT 2
THE ENGINEER'S DISCUSSION OP THE TERM "ANY PERSON AGGRIEVED"
IN SECTION 73-3-14 CITES CASES THAT HAVE BEEN EXPRESSLY OVERRULED
BY THE JURISDICTIONS DECIDING THEM, PAILS TO RESPOND TO THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT CASES CITED IN THE APPELLANTS1 BRIEF, AND DOES
NOT DEAL WITH THE FACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE INSTANT CASE, NOR
WITH THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS THIS COURT IS BEING ASKED TO
INTERPRET.
On

pages

discusses
persons"

the

17-33

of

issue

of whether

as that

term

the

"Plaintiffs

have

the

is used

Annotated, 1953, as amended.
brief

Respondents

brief,

Plaintiffs

in Section

the

are

Engineer
"aggrieved

73-3-14, Utah

Code

The Engineer states on page 28 of his

alleged...their

personal,

economic

and

direct interest in the Engineer's memorandum decision (Appellants1
brief,

p.

25) .

persons. 1 "

That

is not

enough

to make

them

'aggrieved

In support of this statement, the Engineer cites the

case of Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow, 467 P.2d 395 (N.M. 1970).
Ruidoso involved a review of the order of the commissioner of
banking which approved an application establishing a new bank.
protestant was a competing bank who, even though

The

acknowledging

there were no statutes preventing the lawful competition of a new
bank, alleged it would be harmed by a loss of profits because of
the competition.
Had the Engineer taken a few moments to shepardize this case,
he would have discovered Ruidoso was expressly and specifically
overruled

five

years

later

in

De

Vargas

Savings

and

Loan

Association of Santa Fe v. Campbell, 87 N.M. 469, 535 P.2d 1320
(1975) .

And had the Engineer made a full disclosure of what De

Vargas held, it would be clear to this court the United States
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Supreme Court decisions cited and discussed on pages 33-45 of
Appellants1 brief [but which surprisingly are not touched on at all
in the Respondent's brief or the amici

water users' brief, except

for a very perfunctory reference to the Clarke case], the Engineer
would have discovered the New Mexico and Oklahoma cases cited by
the Engineer in his brief, not only fail to establish any authority
for the position taken, but are actually authority for the position
of the appellants in this court.
In De Vargas, which overruled Ruidoso, there is much helpful
language in this later decision which supports the Plaintiffs'
position in the instant case.

The case involved four savings and

loan associations who claimed they would be economically hurt,
because the savings and loan supervisor granted authority to
another building and loan association to operate a branch office.
The trial court dismissed the appeal from the state agency, basing
its dismissal expressly on the Ruidoso case, supra.

The New Mexico

Supreme Court noted the specific issue to be resolved was "whether
the Appellants or associations are persons 'aggrieved and directly
effected' by the order of the Supervisor within the purview of
Section 48-15-133. The broader issue is whether or not New Mexico
will continue to cling to the "legal interest" test of standing as
enunciated in Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow."
The De Vargas court recognized that in Ruidoso it had said
the "true test was whether Appellants' legal rights had been
invaded, not merely whether he has suffered any actual pecuniary
loss or been deprived of any actual pecuniary benefit."

THIS IS

EXACTLY THE SAME TEST THE ENGINEER IS ASKING THIS COURT TO ADOPT
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IN THE INSTANT CASE!

However, the De Vargas court noted "the

efficacy of this test has been denounced by legal scholars and
expressly disclaimed by the United States Supreme Court.

See Data

Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d
184 (1970)."

Data Processing was the very case the United States

Supreme Court relied on in deciding Clarke v. Securities Industries
Association,

497 U.S.

, 107 S.Ct.

, 93

L.Ed.2d

757

(1987), discussed more fully in Appellants1 brief at pages 33-45.
The De Vargas court observed that Data Processing involved
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act found at 5 U.S.C.
Section 702, and noted the general principles espoused in the act
are applicable to the broad question of standing to seek judicial
review, be it specifically

conferred by statute or otherwise.

Consequently, the De Vargas New Mexico Supreme Court found the
discussion of the Federal Administrative Procedures Act in Data
Processing

to

be

applicable

particular fact situation

to

local

interests

and

to

the

then before the court.

The Plaintiffs submit this statement by the De Vargas New
Mexico

Supreme

Court

effectively

disposes

of

the

Engineer's

argument on pages 24-25 of his brief:
However, it must be remembered that federal
regulatory programs in general — and the regulatory
scheme involved in Clarke specifically, are usually much
broader in scope than the narrow administrative process
involved in change applications...Regulation of the
national banking industry is obviously a broad regulatory
scheme, as are many other federal administrative
programs.
That, however, is a far cry from the very
narrow process for acting on change applications as set
forth
in Section
73-3-3,
and
Clarke
is
simply
distinguishable on its facts...We submit that state court
cases applying the 'zone of interest1 test to more narrow
regulatory programs are much more akin to the case at bar
than federal cases."
-8-

Consequently, whether one considers the United States Supreme
Court cases cited by Clarke as involving the federal regulatory
programs

and

the

federal

administrative

procedures

act, or

considers these same cases to be applicable to local state court
cases such as De Vargas, the result is exactly the same.
The Engineer must now admit one of the cases he cited in
support of his arguments pertaining to "aggrieved persons," as well
as his discussion of the applicability of the United States Supreme
Court cases to the

issues before this court, has now been

overruled, and those very states he cited have now adopted the
rationale of the United States Supreme Court cases as those cases
are more fully described in Appellants' brief at pages 33-45.
Oklahoma has also adopted the De Vargas rationale in Bank of the
Lakes v. First State Bank, 708 P.2d 1089

(Okla. 1985).

The

Oklahoma Supreme Court denied the appeal, but only on the grounds
that Section 207(A), as amended by the Oklahoma legislature, did
not recognize as grounds for appeal the type in injury that Bank
of the Lakes alleged. Obviously, Utah has no legislative language
that would carve out a "exception" to the general principles on
standing and "aggrieved parties" as enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in Clarke, and by the New Mexico Supreme Court in De
Vargas.
Going back to De Vargas, there are several additional comments
which the Plaintiffs submit are helpful to this court in deciding
the standing issue in the instant case.
review article

In citing from a law

[Utton, "Through a Glass Darkly:

The Law of

Standing to Challenge Governmental Action in New Mexico," 2 New
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Mexico L. Rev. 171, 177 (1972),] the court approved the following
language:
In addition, if the very thing the complainant is
challenging [is] the lawfulness of governmental action,
to deny standing by saying the action complained of is
lawful is to decide the case on the merits without
deciding argument on the merits.
If the action
complained of is arguably unlawful, then the complaining
party who is injured in fact should be allowed to argue
the merits before the court, and not to have access to
judicial determination barred at the threshold of the
courthouse. (emphasis added)
This is exactly what the Engineer is trying to accomplish in
the instant case —

to stop the Plaintiffs at the courthouse door,

but not allow them to enter the courthouse, or to have a trial on
the merits of whether the Engineer's conduct in conducting the
investigation he admits in his memorandum decision he did conduct
was negligently performed, for failure to follow the statutory
mandates in 73-3-8.
The De Vargas court held that "to attain standing in a suit
arguing the unlawfulness of governmental action, the complainant
must allege that he is injured in fact or eminently threatened with
injury,

economic

or

otherwise.11

In

the

instant

case, the

Plaintiffs have alleged in their second amended complaint numerous
grounds

showing they

are

injured

in

fact, or are

eminently

threatened with injury, economic or otherwise, because of the
action of the Engineer in conducting a faulty investigation of the
evidence presented at his hearing in February, 1985.

Since none

of the facts in the second amended complaint are controverted by
the Engineer or the amici

water users, they must be taken as true

in a motion for summary judgment.

This is another reason why the

Plaintiffs submit the motion for summary judgment was not ripe for
-10-

determination, and should not have been granted.
The De Vargas court adopted holdings from other United States
Supreme Court decisions stating that "standing is not confined to
those who show economic harm, as aesthetic and environment wellbeing, like economic well-being, are important ingredients to the
quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular
environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few
does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the
judicial process."
The New Mexico Supreme Court also found the discussion of
these "standing" issues in a federal circuit court of appeals case
compelling.

Scanwell

Laboratories,

U.S.App.D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859

Inc.

v.

Shaffer,

(D.C.Cir. 1970), the language

approved from Scanwell is as follows:
When the Congress has laid down guidelines to be
followed in carrying out its mandate in a specific area,
there should be some procedure whereby those who are
injured by the arbitrary or capricious action of a
governmental agency or official in ignoring those
procedures can vindicate their very real interests, while
at the same time furthering the public interests. These
are the people who will really have the incentive to
bring suit against illegal government action, and they
are precisely the plaintiffs who insure a genuine
adversary case or controversy.
*

137

*

*

Regardless of the merits of plaintiff's case, it
should be granted the right, if possible, to make a prima
facie
showing that the government's agents did in fact
ignore the Congressional guidelines in the manner in
which they handled the granting of the contracts. If
there is arbitrary or capricious action on the part of
any contracting official, who is going to complain about
it, if not the party denied a contract as the result of
the alleged illegal activity? It seems to us that it
would be a very healthy check in governmental action to
allow such suits, *** (emphasis added)
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Similarly, in the instant case, the Plaintiffs allege they
should be granted the right to make a prima facie

showing that the

Engineer did in fact ignore the Utah Legislature's guidelines in
Section

73-3-8

in

the

manner

in

which

he

conducted

the

investigation of the evidence produced at his February, 1985
hearing, which

evidence clearly

showed the change order was

"detrimental to the public welfare.11
Obviously, the New Mexico Supreme Court in De Vargas adopted
the

reasoning

of

the

United

States

Supreme

Court

in

Data

Processing, as did the United States Supreme Court in Clarke,
supra.

The Utah Supreme Court has also cited Data Processing with

approval with

respect to the

"standing"

issue.

Society of

Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987), in
note 12 thereof on page 1176 of the pacific reports.

Presumably

this court will also adopt the reasoning in Clarke, which is based
on the Data Processing rational and holding, and will also adopt
the other cases cited in Clarke as those cases are more fully
discussed in the Appellants1 brief on pages 33-45.
Unfortunately, the Engineer does not fare any better in the
other cases he cites in support of his contention that Plaintiffs
are not "aggrieved persons" within the meaning of Section 73-3-14.
On pages 29-30 of the Respondent's brief, the Engineer cites and
discusses the case of Deseret Mortuary Co. v. State Securities
Commission, et al., 78 Utah 393, 3 P.2d 267 (1931).

The court in

Deseret Mortuary looked at the entire language of the statute in
question and found from other sections the words "issuers, dealers
or salesmen of securities" thereby convincing the court these were
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the persons to be protected and, consequently, only those persons
had standing. The Engineer in the instant case cannot point to any
language in the Utah water law statutes saying only persons with
"vested water rights have standing," and therefore Deseret Mortuary
does not appear to help him at all.
On the other hand, this court in Deseret Mortuary discussed
certain legal authorities defining the term "any person aggrieved"
and the Plaintiffs submit those definitions are supportive of the
Plaintiffs1 position in this court.

Why the Engineer did not

continue his discussion of Deseret Mortuary by pointing out these
critical definitions, is, again, a mystery to the Plaintiffs,
unless the Engineer believed a discussion of these matters would
be detrimental to his position in this court.
In Deseret Mortuary, the court noted some of the definitions
then in vogue stating "that a party is aggrieved by the judgment
or decree where it operates in his rights of property or bears
directly upon his interest. * * *

The word 'aggrieved1 refers to

a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal property right,
or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation."

The

court also noted other cases saying a person can be aggrieved if
they own property in a severed area, and other cases defining
persons to be aggrieved if they have some pecuniary interest to
protect.
Thus it appears clear this court in Deseret Mortuary defined
"any person aggrieved" at the time the decision was written in 1931
as those whose rights of property are effected by the decree, or
if it bears directly upon their interest, or denies them some real
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or personal property right, or imposes upon them a burden or
obligation. These are the very things the Plaintiffs have alleged
in their second amended complaint.

They are the very terms and

conditions which the Engineer on page 28 of his brief states are
not sufficient to make the Plaintiffs "aggrieved persons," although
Deseret Mortuary reaches a contrary result!
In the case of Colthorp v. Mountain Home Irrigation District,
175 P.2d 1005 (Ida. 1945), discussed

on pages 45-46 of the

Respondent's brief to support the proposition that an "injury" to
another water right must be shown in order to prevent a change in
the point of diversion, the Idaho Supreme Court made it clear the
"injury" they were discussing was within a specific provision of
the Idaho statute, to wit, "As to change a place of use or transfer
water (within a Carey Act system, Section 41-2101, I.e.A.) the

injury
right

which another
and/or

the use

user may set up is the injury

to his

only

water

thereof.11

On pages 28-29 of his brief, the Engineer cites the case of
Northwest Datsun v. Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Commission, 736 P.2d 516
(Okla. 1987) , to support the claim that Plaintiffs do not have
standing to object to the Engineer's memorandum decision.
Engineer says this is "another analogous case."

The

The Plaintiffs

submit it is about as analogous as a hippopotamus to a butterfly!
The Oklahoma Supreme Court was construing a specific statute which
stated that car dealerships could protest new franchises being
opened within a radius of ten miles from the site of a potential
new dealership. The Plaintiffs were outside that ten mile radius,
as the court noted:

"However, in the present case, Appellant
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dealers of the same line-make are not located within ten miles of
the new franchise which they seek to challenge...This legislation
provides for no protest in that event, and it is quite clear that
we may not infer an intent to the contrary."
It is obvious the ten miles radius built-in provision in the
Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Statute is totally missing in the Utah water
law

statutes.

There

is no

built-in

language

by

the Utah

Legislature stating "any aggrieved persons" must have vested water
rights, as the Engineer interprets the statute, and not one of the
Engineer's cases cited in his Respondent's brief so holds under the
facts and circumstances in the instant case.

Furthermore, as

pointed out above, Oklahoma has now adopted the New Mexico Supreme
Court reasoning in De Vargas with respect to "standing."

Bank of

the Lakes v. First State Bank, 708 P.2d 1089 (Okla. 1985).
Similarly, in the case of In re Johnson, et al., 300 P. 492
(Ida. 1931), discussed on page 46 of the Respondent's brief, the
Idaho Supreme Court was dealing with a prior court decree, and an
Idaho statute quite dissimilar from the statutes in the instant
case. The court was construing "injury" that may accrue to another
person growing out of the fact that he is a tenant in common of the
same conduit or ditch facilities with the owner of the water
transferred. Obviously the Plaintiffs in the instant case are not
claiming any joint use of the Conservancy District's or Draper
Irrigation Company's ditch facilities.
Utah

statute

involved

in the

instant

Furthermore, there is no
case

governing

either

"abandonment of water or what rights one tenant in common has
against another." These were the only issues involved in Johnson.
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In summary, then, it appears clear the cases cited by the
Engineer in support of his proposition that the Plaintiffs are not
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 73-3-14 do not
support his conclusion, some of them have been expressly overruled,
and the other cases actually support the Plaintiffs1 position in
this court rather than the Engineer's!

POINT 3
THE CASES CITED BY THE ENGINEER IN SUPPORT OF HIS ARGUMENT
THAT THE CRITERIA OF SECTION 7 3-3-8 DO NOT APPLY TO CHANGE
APPLICATIONS FILED PURSUANT TO SECTION 73-3-3 CONTAIN THE SAME
INFIRMITIES AS THOSE CITED IN POINT 2 AND DO NOT SUPPORT HIS
CONCLUSIONS AT ALL.
The Engineer's argument with respect to this Point 3 is based
on a defective syllogistic reasoning.

The Engineer argues as

follows:
1.

All

Utah

Supreme

Court

cases

dealing

with

change

applications involve competing water rights where the parties on
both sides of the case had "vested water interests."
2.

Admittedly there are no cases from Utah discussing change

applications

under

Section

73-3-3,

nor

the

duties

and

responsibilities of the Engineer under Section 73-3-8, and which
even remotely involve the facts and circumstances of the instant
case, or the precise issues now before this court.
3.

Therefore, the prior cases involving competitors with

vested water rights on both sides of the case must apply to the
facts and circumstances in the instant case, and to the precise
issues now before this court.
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The fatal defect in this type of reasoning is obvious.
Engineer is trying to make apples out of oranges.

The

He is not

comparing apples and apples or oranges and oranges. The cases the
Engineer cites, as described below, involve far different factual
circumstances, and discuss totally different issues than exist in
the instant case.
The Engineer, throughout his Respondent's brief, acknowledges
the Plaintiffs would have standing to challenge the Engineerfs
memorandum

decision

if this case involved

an original water

application under Section 73-3-2, [see Respondent's brief, note 7,
page 20, and his comments on pages 34-35], but then argues the
plaintiffs cannot challenge his decision under change applications
pursuant to 73-3-3, even though the substantial damage to the
public welfare, and to the Plaintiffs' legal interest, personal and
real property, and economic considerations are admittedly the same
in both situations.

The Engineer makes this same argument with

respect to his duties under Section 73-3-8, and asserts even though
he has these duties and responsibilities for an original water
application, he can close his eyes, fold his arms, quietly go to
sleep and not conduct a 73-3-8 investigation when considering
change applications, even though everybody in his office would
admit the change applications create conditions "detrimental to
the public welfare."
The Engineer's memorandum decision admits that, at a hearing
in his office in Salt Lake City on February 26, 1985, he received
information from the protestant that, as a result of the project
construction, his property was flooded in 1983 and 1984, causing

-17-

extensive property damage and further received evidence that the
project "as constructed was detrimental to the public welfare."
The Engineer then states that "In an effort to gain additional
information relative to this matter, the State Engineer's Staff
conducted a field review on May 7, 1985. Representatives of both
the applicant and the protestant were present for the review, which
included

observations

of

alleged

damage

to

protestant!s

the

property, along with observations of the Districtfs construction
which took place in connection with temporary water rights change
applications approved by the State Engineer."
The Plaintiffs submit the Engineer admits in this memorandum
decision

language

investigation

that

his

office

did

in

similar to that contemplated

fact

conduct

an

by Section 73-3-8

pertaining to the evidence he received at the hearing showing the
project, as constructed, was "detrimental to the public welfare."
The Plaintiffs submit, and they allege in their second amended
complaint, this investigation undertaken by the State Engineer was
faulty and negligently done, and the District Court had ample
authority to review the procedures used by the State Engineer in
his

investigation

to

determine

whether

or

not

the

Engineer

undertook the investigation outlined in 73-3-8, and if he did,
whether

he

conducted

this

investigation

negligently

as

the

Plaintiffs1 allege in their second amended complaint.
The Respondent and amici water users are now asking this court
to tear out that portion of the memorandum decision, admitting an
investigation was undertaken, and are asking this court to close
its eyes to what actually happened, and rule on the "record" that
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the Engineer really doesn't have a duty to undertake the very
investigation

he

undertook.

Lifting

a

comment

from

the

Respondent's brief, this argument is "pretty weak soup!"
The first point raised by the Engineer is found on page 4 0 of
his brief.

He states he has never interpreted the criteria of

Section 73-3-8 as applying to change applications, and further
states he considers only whether other water rights will be
impaired when approving or rejecting a change application.

He

states his disposition of the change application in the instant
case "is fully consistent with his long-held interpretation of the
applicable statutes."

This logic and reasoning

falls apart

completely, because the Engineer has failed to deliver to this
court any "record" supporting his conclusion of the Engineer's
"long standing interpretation" of the Utah water laws statutes.
This matter has been fully briefed by amicus

NPCA in its reply

brief which includes some 2 5 memoranda decisions, several of which
show clearly the Engineer's "long standing interpretation" is not
as represented to this court in Respondent's brief.

See also the

Appellants' discussion of this same issue in Point 1, supra,

at

pages 2 - 4.
The next position taken by the Engineer is that the case law
supports his position that the only criteria for approval or
rejection of a change application is whether other vested water
rights would be impaired.

The Engineer then cites Utah Supreme

Court cases on pages 41-44 of his brief, which he alleges interpret
the precise question in the instant case.

However, the Plaintiff

submits not one of those cases deals with a fact situation even
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remotely similar to the facts in the instant case.

This is where

the defective syllogistic reasoning set out in the first paragraph
of this Point 3 applies.
interests

where

the

All the cases cited deal with competing

parties

on

both

established "vested water rights."

sides

of

the

case

had

Therefore the court was not

called upon in any of those cases to construe the precise issue in
the instant case, to wit, whether parties have standing to sue as
"aggrieved persons" when they do not have "vested water rights."
Furthermore, none of the cases cited by the Engineer on pages 4144 deal with whether the Engineer's responsibilities under Section
73-3-8 apply to his consideration of change applications in Section
73-3-3, and his counsel has not enlightened this court by citing
any language dealing with that issue.
The Engineer does cite the case of In re Application

of

Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M.App. 1988), which was not discussed in
the court below.

The Engineer cites Sleeper for the proposition

that he cannot consider the "public welfare" issues imposed upon
him in Section 73-3-8 when considering change applications.

The

court in Sleeper based its decision on two major premises.

The

first

had

was

that

the

parties

all

stipulated

the

Engineer

traditionally and consistently construed the New Mexico state water
laws, and particularly those dealing with the "public interest" to
apply only to original applications for unappropriated waters.
This is not the situation in the instant case, where counsel
for the Plaintiffs and amicus
Association

have

not

National

stipulated

the

Parks and

Utah

State

Conservation
Engineer

has

traditionally and consistently construed the Utah water laws in the
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same way.
in amicus

Furthermore, the excellent discussion of these matters
National Parks and Conservation Association's brief and

the inclusion in the addendum of pertinent memoranda decisions show
the Engineer's interpretation has been anything but consistent.
Furthermore, in the instant case, the Engineer has not supported
his

conclusionary

statements

about

"long

standing

agency

interpretation," nor any of the other assertions on page 4 0 with
an affidavit from the State Engineer, copies of any memoranda
decisions made a part of the Respondent's brief, or even citations
to such memoranda decisions.
The Sleeper case dealt, again, with competing

interests

between water users on both sides who had "vested water rights."
It did not deal with the facts in the instant case, any more than
the Utah Supreme Court cases cited by the Engineer do.

The New

Mexico court noted the legislature had changed the law in 1985 to
provide the Engineer could consider the "public interest," when
approving or rejecting change applications, however the statutes
in force at the time of the Application did not allow "public
interest" to be taken into account. This is totally different from
Section 73-3-8 which has been in existence for decades, and clearly
provides the Engineer can consider all evidence presented to him
bearing on whether the applications are "detrimental to the public
welfare."
In determining whether the Plaintiffs' interests rise to the
level of something which is "detrimental to the public welfare,"
the Engineer in footnote 17 on page 47 of his brief, cites the case
of Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemicals Corp. v. Marsh, 596 F.Supp.
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548 (Dist.Utah 1984), and state "Plaintiffs cannot equate their
private interests to the 'public interests.'" This comment totally
ignores the allegations in the second amended complaint dealing
with the "public" nature of the damage to highways, parks and
recreation properties, ditch facilities belonging to quasi-public
corporations, etc.

The Engineer also fails to point out the

distinctions between the instant case and Great Salt Lake ("GSL"),
and further fails to point out this court has already determined
what the term "public welfare" under the water laws means.

As

discussed on page 52 of the Appellants1 brief, this court in Tanner
v. Bacon, 136 P. 2d 957 (Utah 1943) , held that anything which is not
for the best interest of the public would be "detrimental to the
public welfare."
Clearly

in the instant case, when the change

application

results in a virtual "niagara falls" being allowed to exist on the
mountainside above the Plaintiffs1 properties, and to allow water
to come cascading down with its attendant debris, rocks, etc. and
to destroy Plaintiffs1 real and personal property, to create danger
to the safety and welfare of persons in the vicinity, to tear up
public roads, and gut public parks and recreation properties —

all

as more fully set forth in the Plaintiffs1 second amended complaint
to which this court is referred, and which allegations must be
accepted as true for a motion for summary judgment —

it is clear

the change application is "detrimental to the public welfare."
In GSL, the United States District Court for Utah was asked
to review a decision of the Army Corp. of Engineers to issue a
permit to the Utah Department of Natural Resources to discharge
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fill material into the Great Salt Lake in connection with a floodcontrol project to breach a railroad causeway across the lake. The
plaintiffs filed their complaint to stop this discharge, and sought
a preliminary injunction.

The court on page 353 of the Federal

Reports set out the four grounds the plaintiffs must prove to
entitle them to a preliminary injunction.

The court found the

plaintiffs had failed on their proof on grounds 1, 3 and 4.

Only

the 4th point "A showing that the injunction, if issued, would not
be adverse to the public interest," pertains to any of the issues
in the instant case.
On that point, the court found the Utah Legislature had
already determined and announced the public policy of the State of
Utah would be to breach the causeway.
approved

by

the

Governor

and

This declaration was

legislation

was

passed

after

considerable study and debate. The court specifically found "Thus,
the public interest has been expressed by the representative of the
public, the State Legislature... Given the clear expression of the
legislative and executive branches of the State of Utah, and the
continuing risk of serious flood damage that could be alleviated
by the breach, the court concludes that the movants have not
established that the injunction 'would not be adverse to the public
interest.'"
The Engineerfs counsel in the instant case was also attorney
for some of the defendants in GSL.

He must know the GSL case had

nothing whatsoever to do with an interpretation of Section 73-3-8,
and his inclination to twist and torture the ruling of the federal
court in GSL is indeed a curious result.
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It's obvious the court

in GSL was considering whether the Corp. of Engineers1 action was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law."
Legislature

in

the

It also appears crystal clear the Utah

instant

case

has

not

studied

the

change

application approved by the State Engineer, and which caused damage
to the Plaintiffs1 properties, as well as other public properties
in the area.

Clearly the State Legislature has not given any

permission to the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy

District

and/or Draper Irrigation Company to discharge their waters on to
the Plaintiffs1 property, allowing tens of thousands of gallons of
water to escape down the hillside as it did in 1983 and 1984.
Contrary to all the Engineer's innuendos, the Legislature has, in
Section 73-3-8, made it abundantly clear the Engineer "must" reject
a change application if he finds it will be "detrimental to the
public welfare."

The public interest problems are set out in

substantial detail in the Plaintiffs1 second amended complaint.
The last point made by the Engineer in his brief involves his
attempt to determine legislative intent by examining the language
found in 73-3-3 dealing with "rights and duties of the applicant."
See Respondent's brief, pages 37-40.

The Plaintiffs adopt the

reasoning of amicus

National Parks and Conservation Association in

their

as

reply

brief

position on this issue.

an

adequate

response

to

the

Engineer's

Moreover, it seems rather obvious that if

the "rights and duties" of the applicant are expressly stated in
Section 73-3-3, when considering permanent change applications, to
be the same as the rights and duties of the applicant when original
water applications are being considered, there would be no reason

-24-

to believe the rights and duties of the Engineer in Section 73-33 would not also be subject to a like interpretation, to wit, that
the Engineer's rights and duties to conduct an investigation under
Section 73-3-3 would be the same as his rights and duties in
connection with an original water application, as those rights and
duties are more fully defined in Section 73-3-8.

There would be

no logical reason for the legislature to make a distinction between
the "applicants111 rights and duties and the "Engineer's11 rights and
duties, and in fact the legislature did not do so.
In summary, then, it appears clear the Engineer's brief does
not offer any support for the proposition that the duties and
responsibilities imposed on the Engineer in Section 73-3-8 do not
apply to change applications in Section 73-3-3.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiffs submit this
court should find the Plaintiffs are "aggrieved persons" within the
meaning of Section 73-3-14, that the Plaintiffs have standing to
bring the instant action in the District Court to review the
memorandum

decision

of

the

Engineer,

and

further

that

the

Engineer's duties and responsibilities under Section 73-3-8 do
apply to change applications. The Plaintiffs are entitled to their
day in court with respect to their second amended complaint
alleging the Engineer was negligent in the way he undertook these
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duties and responsibilities which he admits he undertook in his
memorandum decision.
DATED this 20th day of January, 1989.
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